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This research note uses two German data sets – the large-scale German Socio-Economic 
Panel and unique data from own student questionnaires – to analyse the relationship 
between risk aversion and the choice for public sector employment. Main results are: (1) 
more risk averse individuals sort into public sector employment, (2) the impact of career 
specific and unemployment risk attitudes is larger than the impact of general risk attitudes, 
and (3) risk taking is rewarded with higher wages in the private but not in the public sector. 
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1.  Introduction 
Estimates of the public-private sector wage differential have received large attention in 
the last decades (Pedersen, Schmidt-Sorensen, Smith, and Westergard-Nielsen, 1990; 
Dustmann and van Soest, 1997, 1998; Gregory and Borland, 1999; Borjas, 2002). Early 
studies analyse the homogeneous wage differential which is mostly positive. Recently, 
the focus has shifted to the heterogeneity of the wage differential. One result is that 
workers at the lower tail of the wage distribution benefit more from public sector 
employment than workers at the upper tail of the wage distribution, who even earn less 
in the public sector according to several studies (Poterba and Rueben, 1994; Mueller, 
1998; Jürges, 2002; Melly, 2005). Thus, there might be a wage penalty for highly 
qualified employees in the public sector. But why do these workers accept lower wages 
in the public sector? As the demand of private sector firms for highly qualified workers 
is quite large and stable over time, it is not the lack of opportunities. 
A plausible explanation is that some workers have preferences to work in the public 
sector and self-select into public sector firms. Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann 
(2007) find that sector selection on unobservables is reduced after controlling for 
preferences towards risk taking, helping other people, having a successful career, and 
social and political engagement. Moreover, self-selection into public and private sector 
jobs is associated with a gain in happiness. If happiness is an adequate proxy for utility, 
these results suggest that utility does depend on pay as well as on non-monetary firm 
and job characteristics, which are heterogeneously weighted by workers. An important 
non-monetary characteristic is employment security, which is perceived larger in the 
public sector than in the private sector (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005; Luechinger, 
Stutzer, and Winkelmann, 2007). Therefore, higher wages in the private sector might 
reflect a compensating wage differential which is paid to compensate workers for lower 
job security. Because risk averse individuals weigh job security higher, they are more 
likely to sort themselves into public sector employment (Bellante and Link, 1981; 
Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann, 2007). In addition to the utility gain effect from 
self-selection, another efficiency gain is likely to occur on the labour demand side 
because firms can pay lower average compensating wage differentials. 2 
 
Even though this line of reasoning is straightforward, little direct empirical evidence 
exists because most data sets do not contain measures of risk aversion and analyses are 
limited to already employed workers. In this paper, two German data sets are used 
which help to overcome these problems and contribute new findings to the literature 
about risk aversion and selection into public sector employment. First, I use the 2004 
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to estimate the probability of 
being employed in the public sector conditional on individual risk aversion. Moreover, I 
present estimates of earnings functions analysing the public-private sector wage gap and 
the impact of risk aversion. Both analyses are performed for all workers as well as for 
college graduates only. Second, I use unique questionnaire data which was especially 
designed to study compensating wage differentials and sorting into private and public 
sectors. The respondents are highly qualified future applicants, namely Master students 
in Economics and Management, who can choose between two hypothetical job offers 
from a public and a private sector firm.  
 
2.  Evidence from Survey Data 
2.1.  Data 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a longitudinal survey of private 
households and persons in Germany. The data contains a rather stable set of core 
questions asked every year (e.g., education, training, qualification, income, social 
security, sector, housing) and yearly topics with additional detailed questions. The 2004 
wave includes questions concerning individual risk taking behaviour from which the 
following two are used in the subsequent analysis: 
“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try 
to avoid taking risks? (0: risk averse, 10: fully prepared to take risks)” 
“People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate 
your willingness to take risks in your occupational career? (0: risk averse, 
10: fully prepared to take risks)” 3 
 
The 2004 wave comprises information on more than 20000 individuals. However, the 
nature of the topic induces a reduction in sample size by more than a half, because only 
dependent part-time or full-time employed individuals are considered, who have the 
German citizenship and are aged between 18 and 65 years. Descriptive statistics will be 
presented together with the estimation results in the subsequent sections. 
 
2.2.  Probability of Public Sector Employment 
The probability of public sector employment is estimated using a simple binary choice 
model – the Probit model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the 
value one if an individual is employed in the public sector and zero if she is employed 
in the private sector. In addition to the variables measuring risk aversion, several control 
variables are used. Schooling can take three forms: low (“Hauptschule”), medium 
(“Realschule”), and high school (“Fachhochschulreife/ Abitur”). Furthermore, a dummy 
variable indicating a college degree, age in years, a female dummy, and a dummy 
variable for workplace in the new federal states (former East Germany) are considered. 
Table 1 reports marginal effects of the Probit estimates. About 32 percent of all workers 
are employed in the public sector. The first specification shows that individuals, who 
are one point more willing to take risks in general, are on average 0.83 percentage 
points less likely to work in the public sector. The second specification shows that the 
effect is stronger if career specific risk taking behaviour instead of general risk taking 
behaviour is used. The third specification includes both variables and indicates that it is 
in fact career risk taking and not general risk taking which drives the results because the 
latter is not significant anymore. This result is supported in specification four which 
controls for additional characteristics like schooling, college degree, age, gender, and 
new federal states. Higher qualified workers are more likely to be employed in the 
public sector. This result corresponds with previous findings (Bellante and Link, 1981; 
Blank, 1985; Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann, 2007) and might be reasoned by 
public sector demand for higher qualified employees to fulfil the required tasks 
(Gregory and Borland, 1999). Females are also significantly more likely to work in the 
public sector. The results are confirmed in the subsample of employees with college 4 
 
degrees. An interesting finding is that risk taking seems to have a larger effect for 
highly qualified than for low qualified workers. 
-  Insert Table 1 about here 
 
2.3.  Public-Private Wage Gap and Risk Aversion 
The following log-linear earnings functions are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and the log hourly wage as dependent variable. The hourly wage is the gross 
monthly income plus mean gross monthly fringe benefits in Euros divided by actual 
monthly working hours.
1 The first specification in Table 2 shows an unconditional 
average public-private sector wage gap of close to 15 percent. After controlling for 
schooling, college degree, tenure, full-time work experience, part-time work experience, 
unemployment experience, age, gender, and new federal states, the public-private sector 
wage gap is reduced to less than 3 percent. A separate estimate for college graduates 
shows that highly qualified workers do not earn a wage premium in the public sector. In 
fact, they earn on average nearly 3 percent less than college graduates in the private 
sector. However, the negative coefficient of the public sector dummy is not significant 
because of quite large standard errors. These findings are consistent with other studies 
which report that workers at the lower tail of the wage distribution benefit more from 
public sector employment than workers at the upper tail of the wage distribution, who 
even earn less in the public sector (Poterba and Rueben, 1994; Mueller, 1998; Jürges, 
2002; Melly, 2005). 
-  Insert Table 2 about here 
The previous estimates are repeated with additional variables for risk taking (see Table 
3). Whereas general risk taking has no significant impact on wages, more risk taking in 
the career by one point increases the wage by more than 1 percent. Dropping the 
                                                 
1 Whereas all other variables stem from the 2004 wave, fringe benefits are used from the 2005 wave of 
the GSOEP because the respondents report the values retrospective for the last year. To make sure that 
the reported values refer to the employer at time of the interview in 2004, only respondents who did not 
change their employer in the entire year 2004 are considered. 5 
 
insignificant general risk taking variable and including an interaction term between 
public sector and career risk taking reveals an interesting result. In the private sector, the 
rate of return per additional risk point is 1.65 percent. Because the interaction term has 
approximately the same size but is negative, there is no rate of return for risk taking in 
the public sector. The separate estimate for college graduates shows the same pattern. 
-  Insert Table 3 about here 
The finding is plausible since risk taking in the public sector might not be a beneficial 
worker characteristic, whereas risk taking might be used productively in private profit-
maximizing firms (e.g., financial sector). Moreover, risk takers in the private sector 
might sort into risky jobs (e.g., risk of injury) and receive compensating wage 
differentials (Hersch and Viscusi, 1990). Further, more risk tolerant workers in the 
private sector might have higher reservation wages and invest more in job search and, 
consequently, end up in higher paid jobs (Pissarides, 1974; Feinberg, 1977; Pannenberg 
2007). Because human capital investments are also risky decisions, risk averse 
individuals invest less in human capital and, subsequently, earn lower future wages 
(Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Shaw, 1996). If public sector employment would really be 
stable, the employer rather than the employee can cover training costs and retain rents 
so that the correlation between risk aversion and human capital investments is not 
present anymore in the public sector. Overall, the results emphasize an additional source 
of sorting, which is not induced by preferences for employment security but by 
differences in returns for risk taking behaviour between public and private sector 
employment.  
 
3.  Evidence from Student Questionnaires 
3.1.  Data 
Even though the results in section 2.2. show a significant correlation between risk 
aversion and public sector employment, they are subject to potential problems. First, 
public sector employment might also increase risk aversion of employees and, thus, the 
causal relationship is the opposite way around. Second, public and private sector 6 
 
employment might not be a free individual choice but depend on labour market 
conditions. Third, jobs in the public sector differ also in other characteristics than 
employment security. To rule out these potential sources of bias, student questionnaires 
with hypothetical – but still realistic – choices between public and private sector 
employment are applied in this section.  
The questionnaire data was gathered during the first lesson of the course “Introduction 
to Personnel Economics” at the University Duisburg-Essen, Germany, in January 2008. 
The respondents of the written questionnaires are third to fifth year Master students in 
Economics and Management. They are the ideal group to study selection processes of 
highly qualified workers, because the students will soon find themselves in the situation 
of applying for jobs with different characteristics like sector belonging. The 
hypothetical scenario is the following: 
“After finishing your university degree you can choose between two 
employment offers – one from the private sector and one from the public 
sector. The two jobs do not differ in their tasks, whereas salaries and 
employment security are different. Annual earnings in the private sector are 
45000 Euros. In the public sector, annual earnings are lower but you have 
very high employment security. Would you prefer to work in the private or 
public sector?” 
“How much of the annual earnings in the private sector (45000) are you 
willing to give up for working in the public sector with high employment 
security?” 
The questionnaires contain also a set of explanatory variables. First, I use the questions 
from the GSOEP for risk aversion (general risk taking, career risk taking) and a new 
measure of preference for employment security. Second, the students are asked for the 
expected final grade of their Master degree as a productivity proxy. At last, I control for 
the gender of the respondents. A description of the variables can be found in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. 
Descriptive statistics of the used sample are presented in Table 4. The respond rate of 
the students was about 95 percent and 86 out of 94 questionnaires without missing 7 
 
values and inconsistencies in the answers could be used for the subsequent analyses. 57 
percent of these respondents prefer in general to work in the public sector with high 
employment security and lower wages. In fact, they are willing to give up earnings to be 
employed in the public sector of on average 4713 Euros, ranging from 1000 Euros to 
13800 Euros. The mean average risk taking behaviour has about the same size as in the 
college graduate sample of the GSOEP (see Table 1) and is larger for respondents who 
choose to work in the private rather than in the public sector. Further, employment 
security is on average more important for those choosing the public sector. Students 
who choose the private sector expect on average better grades. While 52 percent of all 
students are females, the share of females is 43 percent for private sector choice and 59 
percent for public sector choice.  
-      Insert Table 4 about here 
 
3.2.  Public Sector Choice and Compensating Wage Differential 
Table 5 presents marginal effects of Probit estimates for the general choice to work in 
the public sector. The first specification shows that respondents, who are one point more 
risk tolerant in general, are on average 6 percentage points less likely to choose the 
public sector. Specification two includes career risk taking behaviour instead of general 
risk taking. The effect is with 7.3 percentage points larger than the effect of general risk 
taking behaviour. Specification three contains the new measure for risk aversion against 
unemployment, which has a sizeable marginal effect of 27.5 percentage points. All three 
risk taking variables are combined in specification four. Even though general and career 
risk taking still have an effect of more than 3 percentage points, their impact is not 
significant anymore. The preference for employment security, however, remains highly 
significant even after controlling for the expected final grade and gender in specification 
five. The expected final grade as a proxy for productivity is highly significant and quite 
sizeable, which indicates that better students are more likely to choose the private over 
the public sector. One explanation for this finding might be that more productive 
individuals have better overall employment prospects and do not need to fear 
unemployment. Surprisingly, gender seems to have no impact on the decision of 8 
 
choosing the public sector after controlling for risk aversion and productivity in the 
quite homogenous student sample. This finding indicates that large parts of gender 
differences might be due to unobservable factors which are measured by the gender 
variable in empirical analyses like the one presented in section 2 with the GSOEP.    
-      Insert Table 5 about here 
Instead of the binary public sector choice, it is also possible to exploit the information 
of how much of the hypothetical private sector earnings of 45000 Euros per year the 
respondent is willing to give up to work in the public sector with high employment 
security. This willingness to pay can be interpreted as a compensating wage differential 
which has to be paid for insecure private sector employment. The 43 percent of the 
students who stated that they would always prefer to work in the private sector are given 
a zero, whereas the willingness to pay for public sector employment ranges from 1000 
to 13800 Euros. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in Table 6 reveal the same 
pattern as the previous Probit estimates. More risk averse individuals demand higher 
compensating wage differentials for working in the private sector which offers lower 
employment stability. Career and especially unemployment risk aversion is more 
important in determining the public sector choice than general risk taking behaviour. 
Better students are less willing to pay for public sector employment and gender has no 
significant impact.  
-      Insert Table 6 about here 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Like predicted by theory, more risk averse workers sort into public sector employment 
if employment security is larger in the public than in the private sector. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the impact of general risk attitudes is smaller compared to career 
specific and especially unemployment risk attitudes. Therefore, it seems to be important 
to distinguish between different types of risk aversion when analysing risk aversion in 
different contexts. The reported wage premium in the public sector for the total sample 
is at odds with higher employment security and the theory of compensating wage 9 
 
differentials. One explanation for this finding might be unobserved worker and 
workplace characteristics. Another explanation, which is supported by the data, might 
be that more risky behaviour is rewarded in the private but not in the public sector and, 
thus, more risk taking workers sort into the private sector for a different reason than 
only employment security. 
A positive public-private wage differential in combination with higher employment 
security in the public sector contradicts the theory of compensating wage differentials at 
first glance. As this would obviously lead to an excess supply of labour to the public 
sector, wages could be cut down by the government. Bellante and Link (1981) interpret 
this finding as “overpayment” of public sector workers. The non-profit maximizing 
behaviour, political decisions, collective contracts, and high union density in the public 
sector are likely to lead to high wages. From an economic perspective taxes could be 
spent more efficiently (e.g., education) and a reduction in government spending could 
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Table A.1: Variable List of Student Questionnaires 
variables  questions  coding of answers 
public sector choice (dummy)  After finishing your university degree you can choose between 
two employment offers – one from the private sector and one 
from the public sector. The two jobs do not differ in their tasks, 
whereas salaries and employment security are different. Annual 
earnings in the private sector are 45000 Euros. In the public 
sector, annual earnings are lower but you have very high 
employment security. Would you prefer to work in the private 
or public sector? 
0: private sector, 1: public sector 
compensating wage differential (Euros)  How much of the annual earnings in the private sector (45000) 
are you willing to give up for working in the public sector with 
high employment security? 
in Euros 
general risk taking (0: low, 10: high)  Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks?  
0: risk averse, 10: fully prepared to 
take risks 
career risk taking (0: low, 10: high)  People can behave differently in different situations. How 
would you rate your willingness to take risks in your 
occupational career? 
0: risk averse, 10: fully prepared to 
take risks 
importance employment security (1: high, 4: low)  How important is it for you to be secure from unemployment?  1: very important, 2: important, 3: less 
important, 4: not important 
final grade (1: very good, 3: satisfactory)  What is your expected final degree in your studies?  1: very good, 2: good, 3: satisfactory 
female (dummy)  Are you female or male?  0: male, 1: female 
 13 
 
Tables included in Text 
Table 1: Probability of Public Sector Employment 
  all observations  only college graduates 
  mean  (std.dev.)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  mean  (std.dev.) 
dependent variable: public sector (dummy)  0.3219            0.4835 
 (0.4672)            (0.4998) 
general risk taking  (0: low, 10: high)  4.7842  -0.0083***    -0.0025  0.0009  -0.0041  4.9702 
 (2.1241)  (0.0024)    (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0067)  (2.0437) 
career risk taking  (0: low, 10: high)  4.0632    -0.0099***  -0.0086***  -0.0093***  -0.0173***  4.3941 
 (2.4621)    (0.0021)  (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0057)  (2.4244) 
medium school degree (dummy)  0.4020        0.1165***    0.1593 
 (0.4903)        (0.0148)    (0.3660) 
high school degree (dummy)  0.3328        0.1584***    0.8230 
 (0.4712)        (0.0186)    (0.3818) 
college degree (dummy)  0.2750        0.1452***    1.0000 
 (0.4465)        (0.0163)    (0.0000) 
age (years)  42.4051        0.0056***  0.0083***  45.4444 
 (10.4206)        (0.0005)  (0.0011)  (9.7233) 
female (dummy)  0.4649        0.1139***  0.1880***  0.4364 
 (0.4988)        (0.0107)  (0.0219)  (0.4960) 
new federal states (dummy)  0.2261        -0.0119  0.0377  0.2722 
 (0.4184)        (0.0128)  (0.0248)  (0.4452) 
number of observations  8176  8176  8176  8176  8176  2248  2248 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.0011 0.0022 0.0022 0.0664 0.0523   
Note: ML-Probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 14 
 
Table 2: Public-Private Sector Wage Gap 
  all observations  only college graduates 
  mean (std.dev.)  (1)  (2)  (3)  mean (std.dev.) 
dependent variable: log(hourly net wage in Euros)  2.7324        3.0337 
 (0.4964)        (0.4679) 
public sector (dummy)  0.3347  0.1465***  0.0287***  -0.0268  0.4906 
 (0.4719)  (0.0125)  (0.0108)  (0.0225)  (0.5001) 
medium school degree (dummy)  0.4125    0.1178***    0.1694 
 (0.4923)    (0.0132)    (0.3752) 
high school degree (dummy)  0.3331    0.2898***    0.8150 
 (0.4714)    (0.0178)    (0.3884) 
college degree (dummy)  0.2850    0.2337***    1.0000 
 (0.4515)    (0.0167)    (0.0000) 
tenure (years)  12.3435    0.0173***  0.0152***  13.4932 
 (9.9030)    (0.0018)  (0.0044)  (10.2312) 
tenure squared / 100  2.5041    -0.0260***  -0.0293*** 2.8668 
 (3.4870)    (0.0050)  (0.0112)  (3.6602) 
experience full-time work (years)  17.0050    0.0130***  0.0147**  17.7020 
 (10.6843)    (0.0029)  (0.0063)  (10.5600) 
experience full-time work squared / 100  4.0330    -0.0268***  -0.0597*** 4.2480 
 (4.1435)    (0.0063)  (0.0139)  (4.0541) 
experience part-time work (years)  2.5746    -0.0073**  -0.0160**  2.2718 
 (5.3401)    (0.0035)  (0.0071)  (4.6686) 
experience part-time work squared / 100  0.3514    0.0143  0.0325  0.2694 
 (1.1768)    (0.0128)  (0.0337)  (0.8928) 
experience unemployment (years)  0.3426    -0.0711***  -0.1558*** 0.2037 
 (0.9867)    (0.0081)  (0.0334)  (0.6417) 
experience unemployment / 100  0.0109    0.3403***  1.4865**  0.0045 
 (0.0989)    (0.0620)  (0.6454)  (0.0297) 
age (years)  43.0091    0.0354***  0.0271*  45.8363 15 
 
 (9.7928)    (0.0059)  (0.0140)  (9.2237) 
age squared / 100  19.4566    -0.0367***  -0.0152  21.8599 
 (8.3876)    (0.0066)  (0.0153)  (8.3978) 
female (dummy)  0.4564    -0.1673***  -0.2173*** 0.4288 
 (0.4981)    (0.0120)  (0.0232)  (0.4951) 
new federal states (dummy)  0.2303    -0.3454***  -0.2782*** 0.2888 
 (0.4211)    (0.0129)  (0.0235)  (0.4533) 
constant   2.6833***  1.6318***  2.2323***   
   (0.0088)  (0.1092)  (0.2836)   
number of observations  5614  5614  5614  1600  1600 
R-squared   0.0194  0.4321  0.2852   






Table 3: Risk Aversion and Wages 
  all observations  only college graduates 
  mean (std.dev.)  (1)  (2)  (3)  mean (std.dev.) 
dependent variable: log(hourly net wage in Euros)  2.7324        3.0337 
 (0.4964)        (0.4679) 
public sector (dummy)  0.3347  0.0310***  0.0988***  0.0565  0.4906 
 (0.4719)  [0.0108]  [0.0198]  [0.0443]  (0.5001) 
general risk taking  (0: low, 10: high)  4.7956  -0.0004      4.9813 
 (2.1054)  [0.0029]      (2.0276) 
career risk taking  (0: low, 10: high)  4.0385  0.0109***  0.0165***  0.0220***  4.3444 
 (2.4272)  [0.0026]  [0.0029]  [0.0075]  (2.3978) 
public sector * career risk taking  1.2852    -0.0172***  -0.0184**  1.9763 
 (2.2909)    [0.0043]  [0.0092]  (2.6289) 
control variables (see Table 2)    Yes  Yes  Yes   
number of observations  5614  5614  5614  1600  1600 
R-squared   0.4347  0.4362  0.2913   
Note: OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 17 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Student Questionnaires 
  all observations  private sector choice  public sector choice 
 mean  std.dev.  min. max.  mean  std.dev.  min.  max.  mean  std.dev.  min.  max. 
public sector choice (dummy)  0.57  0.50  0  1  0.00  0.00  0  0  1.00  0.00  1  1 
compensating wage 
differential (Euros)  2685.47 3016.12  0 13800 0.00  0.00  0  0  4713.27 2520.43  1000  13800 
general risk taking (0: low, 10: 
high)  4.97 1.88  0  9  5.43 1.68 2  9 4.61 1.96  0  9 
career risk taking (0: low, 10: 
high)  4.73 1.97  0  8  5.35 1.78 1  8 4.27 2.00  0  8 
importance employment 
security (1: high, 4: low)  1.77 0.76  1  4  2.11 0.81 1  4 1.51 0.62  1  4 
final grade (1: very good, 3: 
satisfactory)  2.14 0.49  1  3  1.95 0.47 1  3 2.29 0.46  2  3 
female (dummy)  0.52  0.50  0  1  0.43  0.50  0  1  0.59  0.50  0  1 
Note: Numbers of observations are 86 for the total sample, 37 for private sector choice, and 49 for public sector choice.   18 
 
Table 5: Probability of Public Sector Choice 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
general risk taking (0: low, 10: high)  -0.0600**      -0.0323  -0.0064 
  (0.0297)    (0.0342)  (0.0357) 
career risk taking (0: low, 10: high)    -0.0732**    -0.0348  -0.0485 
   (0.0292)  (0.0360)  (0.0365) 
importance employment security (1: high, 4: low)      -0.2746***  -0.2454***  -0.2910*** 
      (0.0888) (0.0866) (0.0873) 
final grade (1: very good, 3: satisfactory)          0.4843*** 
       (0.1527) 
female  (dummy)       0.011 
       (0.1383) 
number  of  observations  86 86 86 86 86 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.0357 0.0572 0.1161 0.1446 0.2436 
Note: ML-Probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 19 
 
Table 6: Compensating Wage Differential 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
general risk taking (0: low, 10: high)  -378.2046***      -192.7835  -76.3005 
 (143.0093)      (150.5624)  (158.2197) 
career risk taking (0: low, 10: high)    -397.7173**    -132.5639  -177.8691 
   (172.3240)    (188.2462)  (194.0867) 
importance employment security (1: high, 4: low)      -1539.8680***  -1319.8583***  -1212.2820*** 
     (324.1480)  (318.6840)  (364.7935) 
final grade (1: very good, 3: satisfactory)          1575.6259*** 
       (573.0349) 
female  (dummy)       140.3538 
       (681.5369) 
constant  4563.2951*** 4567.6853*** 5407.0924*** 6602.7969***  2604.17 
  (869.9367) (936.9120) (757.8030)  (1041.4243)  (1844.8037) 
number  of  observations  86 86 86 86  86 
R-squared  0.0553 0.0677 0.1513 0.1805  0.2405 
Note: OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 